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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Carl D. Patterson appeals, pro se, from the district court's summary dismissal of 
his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
According to the Idaho Court of Appeals' unpublished decision in Patterson's 
direct appeal, the underlying facts of Patterson's convictions are as follows: 
Patterson was charged with seventeen counts of lewd conduct with 
a child under sixteen years and two counts of sexual battery, one against 
a child under sixteen and another against a child under seventeen. These 
charges stemmed from allegations that he molested his three 
stepdaughters, C.S., S.S., and G.V., from 1996 to 2005. As part of a plea 
agreement, Patterson pied guilty to two counts of lewd conduct with a 
child under sixteen years, one in 1997 against C.S[.] and one in 2002 
against S.S. 
State v. Patterson, Docket No. 35661, 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 318, p.1 (Idaho 
App. January 22, 2010). Patterson was sentenced to a unified term of twenty years with 
five years determinate on each count to be served concurrently. kl Patterson 
appealed, "contending that the district court improperly considered evidence of 
misconduct at sentencing unrelated to the charges to which he pied guilty and that the 
district court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing an excessive sentence," id., 
p.2, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, id., p.5. 
Patterson filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging his trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance by advising Patterson that, if he pied guilty to two 
felonies, he would either be sentenced to a retained jurisdiction (rider) or placed on 
probation. (R., p.7.) The state filed an answer which included a motion for summary 
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dismissal (R., pp.10-18) and the district court filed a "Notice of the Court's Intent to 
Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief' (R., pp.19-22). Patterson, through counsel, 
filed an objection to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp.23-24.) The 
district court filed a "Second Notice of the Court's Intent to Dismiss Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief" (R., pp.25-27), explaining that Patterson had "waived his right to file 
for Post Conviction Relief in his plea agreement" (id., p. 25). Patterson filed a response 
to that notice, arguing that he could not legally waive his right to assert an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. (R., pp.28-29.) The district court entered a "Memorandum 
Decision and Order Denying Petition for Post Conviction Relief' (R., pp.30-39), ruling 
that Patterson had "knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to pursue 
post-conviction relief' (R., p.35). The court further held that, even if Patterson did not 
waive his right to pursue post-conviction relief, he nonetheless failed to present a 
genuine issue of material fact to show, under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984), that counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial. (R., pp.35-37.) 
The district court entered a "Judgment of Dismissal," dismissing Patterson's post-




Patterson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Is [sic] the plea agreement conditions binding as to force appellant to 
forfeit or waive his constitutional right to challenge his right to effective 
assistance of trial counsel? 
2. Was trial counsel ineffective for advising the appellant to plead guilty to a 
specific reduced sentence? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.1 (capitalization modified).) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Patterson failed to establish that the district court erred when it summarily 
dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
Patterson Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred When It Summarily 
Dismissed His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Patterson contends the district court erred in dismissing his petition for post-
conviction relief. Patterson argues that the district court erred by ruling: (1) his plea 
agreement waived his right to file a post-conviction petition, and (2) even if Patterson's 
"ineffectiveness" claim was not waived, he failed to demonstrate trial counsel's 
performance was both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland. 
Contrary to Patterson's arguments, the district court correctly ruled that, even if 
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not waived under the terms of his plea 
agreement, he failed to show his trial counsel's recommendation that he accept the 
terms of the plea offer was both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland. 1 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's application of 
the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190, 
30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001 ). On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction 
petition, the appellate court freely reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of 
material fact exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant 
to the requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
1 The state opts to not address Patterson's first issue (waiver by the plea agreement) 
inasmuch as the district court's decision on the merits is exceptionally creditable. See 
also Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2005) ("We therefore hold that a 
plea agreement that waives the right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an IAC claim that challenges the 
voluntariness of the waiver."). 
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(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999); 
Edwards v. Conchemco Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). 
C. General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 
P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 
(1983). However, a petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an 
ordinary civil action. A petition must contain more than "a short and plain statement of 
the claim" that would suffice for a complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 
522 (referencing I.R.C.P. 8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal 
knowledge and produce admissible evidence to support his allegations. !sh (citing I.C. § 
19-4903). Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application must 
be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. Drapeau 
v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 
681,684,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own initiative. "To 
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence 
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a 
claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-
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4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each 
element of petitioner's claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. 
§ 19-4906 (b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must 
accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept 
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, 
or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 
(citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797,799, 25 P.3d 110,112 (2001)). If the alleged 
facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, the trial court is not required 
to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition. ~ (citing Stuart v. 
State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the 
application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved 
by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." 
Id. 
D. Legal Standards Applicable To Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims 
To be entitled to relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-
conviction petitioner must satisfy the two prong test set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. The petitioner must demonstrate: 1) 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 2) there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings 
would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. A reviewing court evaluates 
counsel's performance at the time of the alleged error, not in hindsight, and presumes 
that "trial counsel was competent and that trial tactics were based on sound legal 
strategy." State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 791-92, 948 P.2d 127, 146-47 (1997). 
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Counsel's strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on review or serve 
as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless the 
UPCPA petitioner has shown that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles 
v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994); Cunningham v. State, 117 
Idaho 428, 430-31, 788 P .2d 243, 245-46 (Ct. App. 1990). "The constitutional 
requirement for effective assistance of counsel is not the key to the prison for a 
defendant who can dredge up a long series of examples of how the case might have 
been tried better." Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992). 
E. The District Court Properly Dismissed Patterson's Post-Conviction Petition 
The district court ruled that, "even had Patterson not waived his right to pursue a 
claim for post-conviction relief, Patterson's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
are subject to summary dismissal." (R., p.35.) On appeal, Patterson contends: 
In the instant case appellant has brought forth the claim that in fact his 
attorney did promise him he would receive either aa [sicJ Ryder [sic] or 
probation if he accepted a guilty plea.121 It was not within the scope of the 
courts [sic] authority to dismiss this claim without conclusive evidence that 
the claim was without merit. This could of [sic] only been resolved by 
holding a [sic] evidentiary hearing to resolve any factual dispute that 
existed with this claim. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
In its "Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief," the district court acknowledged the standards for ineffective assistance of 
2 In his post-conviction petition, Patterson alleged that his trial counsel "told me to plead 
guilty to 2 felonies and I would get a rider or probation." (R., p.7.) 
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counsel claims under Strickland (R., pp.35-36) and applied the relevant case law to 
Patterson's claim, explaining: 
Idaho case law is clear that an attorney's assurance or 
representation concerning the sentence cannot provide the basis for post-
conviction relief. This issue was addressed in Pierce v. State, 124 Idaho 
406, 860 P.2d 22 (1993) (Pierce). In Pierce the same issue was asserted 
in support of a claim of post-conviction relief. Although the issue came up 
in a slightly different context this Court believes the result is the same. In 
Pierce, rather than claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
petitioner claimed that his guilty plea was coerced because his attorney 
had given him an assurance "that a guilty plea could result in no more 
than a ten year sentence." Id. at 407. In addressing this issue the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated as follows: 
With respect to Pierce's claim that his plea of guilty was 
"coerced" because of a representation by his attorney about 
the sentence Pierce would receive, the district court 
explained: 
Finally, Pierce claims that he was "coerced" 
into entering his guilty plea. Once again, this 
claim is supported only by Pierce's allegation. 
The alleged coercion was the assurance of 
Pierce's counsel that a guilty plea could result 
in no more than a ten year sentence. Such an 
alleged assurance of leniency made solely by 
the defendant's own counsel does not 
constitute grounds for post-conviction relief. 
In support of this holding, the court again cited to Walker [v. 
State, 92 Idaho 517, 446 P.2d 886 (1968)]. In Walker, the 
petition alleged that Walker's attorney had told him he would 
receive a lesser sentence than ultimately was imposed. 
Walker's appeal centered on his claim that he was entitled to 
an evidentiary hearing on this issue. The Supreme Court 
rejected that contention, holding that the misrepresentation 
by counsel as to the sentence which Walker would receive 
did not "constitute grounds for post-conviction relief." 92 
Idaho at 521,446 P.2d at 890. 
Again, on this appeal, Pierce counters the district 
court's holding by requesting that Walker be overruled. We 
will not do so. We uphold the district court's dismissal of the 
alleged claim. 
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124 Idaho at 407. See also Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514, 517, 211 P.3d 
123, 126 (Ct. App[.] 2009) (a good faith assurance of leniency or a mere 
prediction by a defense counsel to a defendant of the sentence anticipated 
is no grounds for post conviction relief although the sentence imposed is 
greater than predicted). This Court concludes that the fact that Patterson 
asserts that his counsel made representations concerning the forthcoming 
sentence does not demonstrate that his performance was deficient in any 
manner. 
(R., pp.36-37.) 
The district court's analysis in rejecting Patterson's claim that his trial attorney 
provided deficient performance by allegedly telling Patterson he would be sentenced to 
either a rider or probation is sound. The district court accurately determined that an 
incorrect prediction of a sentence does not state a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. In Walker, relied upon by the district court, the Idaho Supreme Court 
succinctly stated: 'The alleged assurance of leniency was made solely and only by 
appellant's appointed counsel. This does not constitute grounds for post-conviction 
relief." 92 Idaho at 521, 446 P.2d at 890 (emphasis added). Inasmuch as there is no 
practical difference between an assurance of leniency (as in Walker) and Patterson's 
claim that his trial attorney told him he "would get a rider or probation" (R., p.7), 
Walker's holding that such a claim does not warrant post-conviction relief applies to 
Patterson's claim. See Bjorklund v. State, 130 Idaho 373, 376, 941 P.2d 345, 348 (Ct. 
App. 1997) ("counsel's incorrect predictions about a possible sentence or action by the 
court does not amount to ineffective assistance, and, ... , does not render a guilty plea 
involuntary."); see also Russell v. State, 105 Idaho 497, 500, 670 P.2d 904, 907 (Ct. 
App. 1983). Patterson's claim that he entered his guilty pleas upon representations of 
counsel that he would get either a rider or probation fails to demonstrate ineffective 
assistance of counsel as a matter of law. 
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The district court also found that Patterson's plea colloquy reasonably informed 
him that any representations made by trial counsel in regard to what sentence he would 
receive was not determinative of his actual sentence, stating: 
Further, even if such a representation was made by Patterson's trial 
counsel, the colloquy between the Curt and Patterson at the time of his 
change of plea hearing should have adequately apprised Patterson that 
neither Patterson's attorney nor any recommendations of the State were 
controlling upon the sentencing judge. Despite this dialogue with the 
Court, Patterson knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered his plea of 
guilty. 
(R., p.37; see Exhibit, recording of 5/13/2008 Change of Plea Hearing, 14:45 - 15:30 
(plea colloquy showing: (a) no other promises were made to Patterson regarding any 
special sentence, favorable treatment, or leniency, (b) Patterson was made aware that 
the judge was not required to follow recommendations of counsel and was the only one 
who could promise what his sentence would be, and (c) Patterson understood his 
sentence might be different than what he expected, and if so, he had no right to 
withdraw his guilty pleas based on that fact); 22:35 - 23:10 (Patterson said he had no 
concerns, issues or questions about his guilty plea)). The record shows Patterson 
completely understood that the court could impose any sentence it thought appropriate 
within the statutory maximum. 
The plea colloquy shows that Patterson could not have reasonably relied upon 
his trial counsel's (alleged) representation about what his sentence would be when he 
pied guilty. Even without considering the plea colloquy, such representation by trial 
counsel udoes not constitute grounds for post-conviction relief." Walker, 92 Idaho at 
521, 446 P .2d at 890. Patterson has failed to demonstrate any error in the district 
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court's determination that he failed to present a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether trial counsel's performance was deficient under Strickland. 
Moreover, the district court correctly determined "Patterson provides no grounds 
indicating how his counsel's allegedly deficient performance prejudiced him." (R., p.37.) 
When the alleged deficiency involves counsel's advice in relation to a guilty plea, "to 
satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would 
have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and 
citations omitted). "Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must 
convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational 
under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 
(2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)). As indicated by the district 
court, Patterson failed to allege in his post-conviction petition that, absent counsel's 
deficient performance, he would not have pied guilty, but would have gone to trial 
instead. (See R., pp.6-9.) Further, Patterson failed to allege, much less demonstrate, 
that a decision to reject the plea agreement would have been rational, especially 
considering that he faced 19 felony charges and a sentence of up to fixed life. 
Patterson has failed to show the district court erred in holding that his post-conviction 
petition provided "no grounds indicating how his counsel's allegedly deficient 
performance prejudiced him." (R., p.37.) 
In sum, Patterson has failed to show any error in the district court's determination 
that he failed to meet his burden of demonstrating his trial counsel's performance was 
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both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland. Therefore, the dismissal of his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's summary 
dismissal of Patterson's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 13th day of June, 2012 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of June, 2012, I caused two true and 
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Carl D. Patterson, #89652 
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